State v. Willard Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 45204 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-13-2017
State v. Willard Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45204
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation




State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9582





IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 45204
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-24397
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After  Cody  Willard  pled  guilty  to  aggravated  battery  on  the  grounds  of  a  correctional
facility, the district court sentenced him to a unified term of six years, with two years fixed.
Mr. Willard appeals from his judgment of conviction and asserts that his sentence is excessive in
light of the mitigating factors in his case.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr.  Willard  pled  guilty  to  aggravated  battery  on  the  grounds  of  a  correctional  facility,
I.C. §§ 18-903(b), 907(a), 19-2520F, for punching another inmate and breaking his ribs
(R., pp.87–94; Tr., p.18, L.18–p.19, L.11).  As part of the plea, the State dismissed the persistent
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violator enhancement and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of six years, with two years
fixed, which by statute would have to run consecutively to Mr. Willard’s other sentence.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.10–18.)  Mr. Willard agreed to pay restitution and participate in the presentence
investigation.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.18–22.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of six years, with two years
fixed, per the plea agreement.  (Tr., p.27, Ls.13–17.)  It suggested that sentence was appropriate
given Mr. Willard’s numerous misdemeanor convictions, poor performance on the rider related
to his earlier felony, and his behavior during his incarceration on that felony.  (Tr., p.27, L.20–
p.29, L.21.)
Mr. Willard asked for a sentence of three years, with one year fixed.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.8–10.)
Defense counsel acknowledged Mr. Willard’s criminal history and poor behavior during his
incarceration, and suggested to the court that Mr. Willard was a young man who had a lot of
growing up to do.  (Tr., p.30, L.11–p.31, L.4.)  But defense counsel said that Mr. Willard could
turn his life around, and that becoming institutionalized was not going to help him do that.
(Tr., p.31, L.14–p.32, L.18.)  In fact, defense counsel believed that this crime was in part because
Mr. Willard had adopted some of the culture of the prison, but that Mr. Willard had learned his
lesson.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.12–22.)  A year fixed would give Mr. Willard a chance to prove he had
turned things around without institutionalizing him more than necessary.  (Tr., p.32, L.23–p.33,
L.5.)
Finally, Mr. Willard told the court:
I agree with some of what the prosecutor said.  What happened with this incident,
it was totally uncalled for, and I’m remorseful for the incident and I’m sorrowful
for it.
When I did my rider, when I got flopped, sent to prison, I didn’t have the
mindset, nor was I ready to grow up.  This incident in this case, it opened my eyes
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a lot, as well as being where I’ve been in the last year.  And I’ve had a lot of time
to reflect on it and to work on myself.
By  no  means,  you  know,  am  I  not  remorseful  for  this.   And  in  the  last
year, I tried to do a 180, 100 percent.  It’s been going on 13 months since I have
had a disciplinary write-up.
Parole,  .  .  .  I  go  back  in  front  of  them  in  September.   I  also  started  my
Thinking for Change, as well as my anger management classes.  And they’re
willing to give me a six-month date after my classes are completed, which I have
learned a lot from, my classes and doing time in max that I have done.
As a result of this incident, it has been four months in ag-seg with
absolutely nothing, which was justified for punishment, as well as, until I am
released from parole [sic], I’ll do the rest of my time in max because of this.  I
have had a pretty severe punishment, as far as inside the institution goes.
And  I  have  a  four-year-old  son  out  there  who  is  waiting  on  me  and
depending on me to come home.  I’ve been out of his life for three years now, and
it was real selfish to make the decisions and the choices that I have made to
continue myself in my stay inside this prison.  And I believe one year fixed,
which would go along with my parole board, is fair punishment for what has
happened.
(Tr., p.33, L.20–p.35, L.9.)
The court said it was concerned with the violent nature of this crime and also the impact
that Mr. Willard’s sentence would have on other inmates in the institution, and followed the
State’s recommendation of a six-year term, with two of those years fixed, to run consecutively to
Mr. Willard’s other sentence as required by statute.  (Tr., p.36, L.8–p.37, L.24; R., pp.99–101.)
Mr. Willard filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency within fourteen days of the
judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.109–11.)   The court denied his motion (R., pp.124–26), and
Mr. Willard filed a notice of appeal timely from that order1 and his judgment of conviction
(R., pp.130–33.)
1 Mr. Willard does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Willard to a unified term of six
years, with two years fixed, for aggravated battery?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Willard To A Unified Term of
Six Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Aggravated Battery
When a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, this Court will conduct
an independent review of the record, taking into account “the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834
(2011).   The  Court  reviews  the  district  court’s  sentencing  decision  for  an  abuse  of  discretion,
which occurs if the district court imposed a sentence that is unreasonable, and thus excessive,
“under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002); State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish  the  primary  objective  of  protecting  society  and  to  achieve  any  or  all  of  the  related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.   Mr. Willards’s
sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating evidence in this case, including his young age,
difficult upbringing, remorse, and desire to change.
Mr. Willard appears to have had a fairly healthy early childhood.  But then Mr. Willard
lost  his  grandmother,  with  whom Mr.  Willard  was  very  close,  and  his  family  moved to  a  new
house and his neighbor started sexually abusing him.  (PSI, p.47.)  That abuse continued until
Mr. Willard finally told his mother what was happening when he was fourteen.  (Id.)
Mr.  Willard  turned  to  drugs  to  help  him  cope  with  that  trauma.   (PSI,  pp.48,  50.)   He  started
drinking when he was eleven, smoking marijuana when he was twelve, and using
methamphetamine when he was fourteen.  (PSI, pp.50–51.)  His life continued to unravel from
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there—he had a difficult time in school and with social interactions, dropped out of school in the
ninth grade, and was diagnosed with ADHD, dyslexia, and as mentally disturbed.  (PSI, p.49.)
He committed his first felonies when he was approximately twenty, and has been
incarcerated since.  (PSI, p.40.)  At that time, he was diagnosed with amphetamine and cannabis
dependence with psychological symptoms in a controlled environment, alcohol dependence,
generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD, mood disorder, and ADHD.  (PSI, pp.92–93.)
Mr. Willard was just twenty-three when this crime took place.  (PSI, p.40.)  As
recognized by defense counsel, he has a lot of growing up to do.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.11–13.)  It is not
too late, however, for him to turn his life around and he expressed his intention to do just that at
the sentencing hearing.  (Tr., p.34, Ls.2–18.)  In addition, Mr. Willard’s remorse at sentencing is
a positive sign going forward.  (Tr., p.33, Ls.20–24.)  As defense counsel explained, the longer
Mr. Willard is incarcerated, the more institutionalized he will become.  (See Tr., p.31, L.14–p.32,
L.18.)  A shorter sentence can meet the goals of sentencing while ensuring that Mr. Willard does
not adopt prison culture as his own.
In light of these mitigating factors, including Mr. Willard’s young age, difficult
upbringing, remorse, and desire to change, the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
him to a unified term of six years, with two years fixed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Willard respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 13th day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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